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AI artificial intelligence brings about new quantitative techniques to assess the state of an economy.
Here, we describe a new measure for systemic risk: the Financial Risk Meter (FRM). This measure is
based on the penalization parameter (λ) of a linear quantile lasso regression. The FRM is calculated
by taking the average of the penalization parameters over the 100 largest US publicly-traded financial
institutions. We demonstrate the suitability of this AI-based risk measure by comparing the proposed
FRM to other measures for systemic risk, such as VIX, SRISK and Google Trends. We find that
mutual Granger causality exists between the FRM and these measures, which indicates the validity of
the FRM as a systemic risk measure. The implementation of this project is carried out using parallel
computing, the codes are published on www.quantlet.de with keyword FRM. The R package
RiskAnalytics is another tool with the purpose of integrating and facilitating the research, calcu-
lation and analysis methods around the FRM project. The visualization and the up-to-date FRM can
be found on hu.berlin/frm.
||Corresponding author.
This is an Open Access article published by World Scientific Publishing Company. It is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY) License. Further distribution of this work is permitted, provided the original
work is properly cited.
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1. Introduction
Systemic risk is hazardous for the stability of financial markets, since the failure of one
firm may impact the stability of the whole system. There are various definitions of systemic
risk. One of the most popular definitions is introduced in Schwarcz (2008). He defined
systemic risk as a trigger event, such as an economic shock or institutional failure, causing
a chain of bad economic consequences, sometimes referred to as domino effect. This
definition indicates that interlinkages and interdependencies in a system or market are very
crucial for controlling systemic risk. The financial crisis in 2008 is an example. After the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, several more financial cooperations bankrupted as a result
of their interlinkages with Lehman Brothers. Consequently, there has been a surge in the
interest in measuring and controlling systemic risk since the 2008 crisis, which has led to
an increase in the research on this topic.
Several methodologies for measuring systemic risk have been proposed. Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2016) proposed CoVaR, the value at risk of financial institutions conditional
on the other institutions being under distress, which uses two linear quantile regressions.
Hautsch et al. (2015) refined this algorithm by introducing linear quantile lasso regression
with a fixed penalization parameter λ for each company to select the relevant risk drivers.
Fan et al. (2016) and Härdle et al. (2016) used a nonlinear Single Index Model
(SIM) combined with a variable selection technique to select risk factors. In their appli-
cation, they use data on 200 financial companies and seven macro variables to estimate
CoVaR. During the estimation procedure, a time-varying penalization parameter λ is
generated. This series has a striking pattern: higher values correspond to financial crisis
times and lower values correspond to stable periods. This observation has led to the idea to
use the penalization parameter λ itself as a measure for systemic risk. Hautsch et al. (2015)
applied a fixed λ for each firm, and not time-varying.
Fan et al. (2016) provided the λ series for single companies. In contrast, we would like
to see the overall behavior of λ. Härdle et al. (2016) compared the linear quantile lasso
model and SIM, and concluded that SIM is more suited than the linear model, but that the
linear quantile lasso model is also valid in terms of backtesting. Indeed, if one generates λ
series for 100 firms with more than 300 observations each, then the application of SIM is
not realistic. Since linear quantile lasso is easier to apply and time saving, we decided to
use it to compute the FRM.
We use log return data from the 100 largest US publicly-traded financial institutions as
well as six macro variables. Our model is based on daily log returns of these financial
institutions. The time period under consideration runs from April 5, 2007 until September
23, 2016 and covers several documented financial crises (2008, 2011). We observe that the
pattern of this risk measure is more informative on financial risk. The shape and volatility
of the series correspond to the market volatility and financial events with a large impact on
systemic risk are clearly visible. Therefore, this series of averaged λ may be called a























































































Financial Risk Meter (FRM). Zbonakova et al. (2017) applied linear quantile lasso re-
gression to analyze the behavior of the λ series. They found that λ is sensitive to the
changes of volatility, which provided the theoretical evidence for the FRM to be a systemic
risk measure, as high volatility indicates high risk.
We introduce the methodology of the FRM, describe the risk levels, the computational
implementation as well as possible visualizations. We compare the FRM with other sys-
temic risk measures, such as VIX (Hallett, 2009), SRISK (see Brownlees and Engle, 2016)
as well as the Google trends of keywords related to financial crises (see Preis et al., 2013).
We find that the FRM and these risk measures have mutual Granger causality, which
indicates the validity of the FRM as a systemic risk measure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the methodology used
to construct our FRM, which is quantile lasso modeling, is presented. Section 3 presents
the data, computational challenge and the visualization of the results. Section 4 shows the
validity of our FRM as a measure for financial risk by comparing with other financial risk
measures. Section 5 concludes, the financial institutions applied in this paper that are listed
in Appendix. All the R programs for this paper can be found on www.quantlet.de (Borke
and Härdle, 2017a).
2. FRM Methodology and Estimation
In this section, we describe the methodology and algorithm used to compute FRM. Since
the penalization parameters are computed based on an L1-norm (LASSO) quantile linear
regression, this regression framework is introduced first. Within this framework, the
penalization parameter λ is exogenous. Since the FRM is distilled from the selected
penalization parameter, we subsequently discuss methods to select λ.
2.1. Linear quantile lasso regression model
Following Härdle et al. (2016), we introduce the quantile lasso regression model. Let m be
the number of macro variables describing the state of the economy, k the number of firms
under consideration, j 2 {1,…, kg. Then p ¼ k þ m 1 represents the number of covari-
ates. t 2 {1,…, Tg is the time point with T the total number of observations (days). s is the
index of moving window, s 2 {1,…, ðT  ðn 1ÞÞg, where n is the length of window size.
Then the quantile lasso regression is defined as
X sj, t ¼ α sj þ As>j, t β sj þ " sj, t, ð1Þ




, Mst1 the m-dimensional vector of macro variables, X
s
j, t is the
p m-dimensional vector of log returns of all other firms except firm j at time t and in moving
window s, α sj is a constant term and β
s
j is a p 1 vector defined for moving window s.
The regression is performed using L1-norm quantile regression proposed by Li and Zhu
(2008):
min
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where λ sj is the penalization parameter, and the check function ðuÞ is
ðuÞ ¼ jujcjIðu• 0Þ   j,
where c ¼ 1 corresponds to quantile regression. The L1-norm quantile linear regression can
be used to select relevant covariates (other firms and macro state variables) for each firm.
2.2. Penalization parameter λ
Since Equation (2) has an L1 loss function and an L1-norm penalty term, the optimization
problem is an L1-norm quantile regression estimation problem. The choice of the penali-
zation parameter λ sj is crucial. There are several options to select λ
s
j , e.g., with the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) or using the Generalized Approximate Cross-Validation cri-
terion (GACV). Yuan (2006) conducted simulations and concluded that GACV outper-
forms BIC in terms of statistical efficiency. Therefore, we determined λ sj with the GACV
criterion in the FRM model and set λ sj as the solution of the following minimization
problem:
min GACVðλ sj Þ ¼ min
P sþðn1Þ
t¼s ðX sj, t  α sj  As>j, t β sj Þ
n df ,
where df is a measure of the effective dimensionality of the fitted model. The advantage of
GACV is that it also works for p > n, which can be important for the FRM if the moving
window size is small.
To compute the FRM, we perform the regression analysis as described above and select
the λ s, j for each firm j using GACV. The FRM is defined as the average lambdas over the






3. Computational Challenges and Visualization
3.1. Data
To compute the FRM, we use data from 100 US publicly-traded financial institutions as
well as six macro variables. The selection of financial companies is based on the NASDAQ
company list1 and based on the market capitalization. The selected companies are the 100
US publicly-traded financial institutions with the largest market capitalization, see
Table A.1 in Appendix.
Initially, we used data on the 200 US publicly-traded financial institutions with the
largest market capitalization to compute the FRM. However, the smaller companies in this
set change regularly over the time period under consideration (2007–2016) due to, for
instance, bankruptcies. This leads to obvious data download issues and therefore we use
1See the NASDAQ webpage: http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx?industry=Finance.























































































only 100 firms. Figure 1 shows the cumulative market capitalization of US financial firms.
The x-axis represents the firms ordered by market capitalization and the y-axis the
cumulative market capitalization. We observe that the largest 100 firms cover more than
85% of the total market capitalization of all companies in the US financial market and we
therefore can restrict our analysis to 100 firms. Furthermore, the results of estimating the
FRM based on 100 or 200 firms are very similar if the moving window size is the same.
Figure 2 plots both FRM series with the window size n ¼ 126, the shape and the trends of
them are similar.
We select six macro state variables to represent the general state of the economy: (1) the
implied volatility index, VIX from Yahoo Finance; (2) the changes in the three-month
Treasury bill rate from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; (3) the changes in the slope
of the yield curve corresponding to the yield spread between the 10-year Treasury rate and
the three-month bill rate from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; (4) the changes in the
credit spread between BAA-rated bonds and the Treasury rate from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis; (5) the daily S&P500 index returns from Yahoo Finance, and (6) the
daily Dow Jones US Real Estate index returns from Yahoo Finance.
Figure 1. The x-axis Represents the Number of Firms Ordered by Market Capitalization and the
y-axis the Percentage of Total Market Capitalization
Figure 2. FRM with 100 Firms (black) and FRM with 200 Firms (gray), Moving Window Size
n ¼ 126























































































To compute the FRM, we employ the tail parameter  ¼ 0:05. To find a stable window
size, n, we have to make a trade-off. We find that the lasso selection technique performs
worse if the window size is too small. Since we use daily data, the moving window size
should be larger than 50, so that the estimation for each window is more precise. The
results of using different window sizes (we have considered window sizes n ¼ 63 (one
quarter) and n ¼ 126 (half a year)) are shown in Figure 3. The larger the window size, the
more lagged, but also the smoother the plot is. Cross correlation can be used to determine
the time delay of a time series, which we apply here to estimate the FRM with n ¼ 63 and
the FRM with n ¼ 126. In Figure 4 and Table 1, the largest autocorrelation between FRM
with n ¼ 63 and the lagged FRM with n ¼ 126 is 0:967 from lag 29 to lag 22.
Figure 3. FRM with Different Moving Window Size, n ¼ 63 (black) and n ¼ 126 (gray), Both
Series are Scaled into the Interval [0,1], from July 6, 2007 Until September 23, 2016
Figure 4. Cross Correlation Between FRM with n ¼ 63 and FRM with n ¼ 126, Where the
Number of Firms is 100
Table 1. Cross-Correlation Between the Estimates of the FRM with n ¼ 63 and FRM with n ¼ 126
Lag 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21
Cross correlation 0.963 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.963























































































We conclude that the FRM with n ¼ 63 leads the FRM n ¼ 126 by at least 22 periods.
From all the preceding, we set the moving window size to n ¼ 63.
For each firm, we have 2, 386 daily observations and 105 covariates (99 firms and 6
macro-state variables). The FRM is the average of the λ’s computed from the 100 indi-
vidual firms. The λ’s for the individual firms are more volatile and less smooth than the
average over 100 firms and therefore more robust to reflect the impact from financial
events on systemic risk. Figure 5 illustrates this by plotting the λ of firm Wells Fargo
(the largest firm by market capitalization) and the FRM.
3.2. Computational challenges
We wrote a script to automatically download the data from Yahoo Finance and Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The R package quantmod is used. More details and the script
are available from Quantnet ( FRM_download_data).
The L1-norm quantile regression used to generate the λ series is computationally in-
tensive and therefore time-consuming, if applied sequentially for a large number of firms,
see for instance the code from Quantnet ( FRM_lambda_series). Therefore, we consider
parallel computing in R to reduce the computation time. R offers several algorithms for
performance computing, such as lapply, mclapply, parLapply, for and foreach2. For our
purposes, the foreach loops is the fastest solution, which we use for implementation.
We use the doParallel and foreach packages in R as developed and proposed by
Calaway et al. (2015) and Calaway et al. (2015b), see also Kane et al. (2013). Since we
have 100 financial firms, we use the foreach loops twice: the first loop is for the 100
financial firms with the second loop nested in the first loop to perform the moving window
estimation. The speed of computation is increased considerably, the script is available from
Quantnet: FRM_parallel_compute (Figure 6).
Without the use of parallel computing, i.e., using a processor with four cores for each
moving window, it requires around two minutes to generate the FRM estimate for one day.
The Research Data Center (RDC) of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin has provided access
Figure 5. FRM (black) and λ of Wells Fargo (gray), Both Series are Scaled into Interval [0,1], from
April 5, 2007 Until September 23, 2016
2The webpage http://www.parallelr.com/r-with-parallel-computing/provides an overview.























































































to their multi-core servers. Their servers have respectively 24, 32 and 40 cores. By using
these servers combined with parallel computing, the average computation time is reduced
approximately 12 s to obtain a daily value for the FRM. The FRM webpage is updated
weekly, which takes only 1 minute to generate the FRM series for five working days.
3.3. Visualization
To implement the visualization of the FRM, we use the JavaScript framework D3.js (or just
D3 for Data-Driven Documents), which is a JavaScript library for producing dynamic, inter-
active data visualizations in web browsers. The QuantNetXploRer is a good example of D3 in
power. More information about the D3 architecture, its various designs and the D3-based
QuantNetXploRer can be found in Bostock et al. (2011) and Borke and Härdle (2017b).
Figure 6 illustrates the D3-based FRM Visualization, and more examples e.g., for Asia,
Europe are available in Althof et al. (2019).
3.3.1. Descriptive statistics
Figure 6 shows the FRM series from April 5, 2007 through September 23, 2016. The FRM
has no theoretical upper bound. In the time frame under consideration, the maximum value
is 0:075, which occurred on December 15, 2008 and the mean value is 0:021. We observe
several peaks in the FRM series, which correspond to crises and other events in these
periods. Two peaks corresponded to the financial crises in 2008 and 2010. The peak in the
first quarter of 2009 was at the height of the Great Recession: 800,000 jobs were lost and
the unemployment rate rose to 7:8% in the US, which was the highest since June 1992.
Another peak around the fourth quarter of 2011 coincided with the decline in stock markets
in August 2011, which was due to fears of contagion of the European sovereign debt crisis
to Spain and Italy.
Figure 6. The Graph of FRM























































































Therefore, one may state that the peaks of FRM series identify financial events and their
impact on financial and systemic risk. The minimum of the FRM series in the time period
under consideration was observed on August 26, 2014, with a value of 0:009. This was a
relatively stable period.
3.3.2. Risk levels
For convenience and following the color scheme of US homeland security office, we divide
risk into five levels with different classifications and colors. The levels of risk are defined
as different intervals of ratios for the FRM. These ratios are computed based on the past
values of the FRM. As shown in Figure 7, we have five levels of risk with five color codes.
The current risk level is determined by the ratio based on all past FRM observations into
which the current λ falls. Table 2 presents the risk levels as well as the colors, descriptions
and ratios of the risk levels.
As an example, on September 23, 2016 the value FRM was 0:013. Since the maximum
of FRM series up to that date was 0:075, the ratio of this risk measure on September 23,
2016 was 17:3%. Since this is less than the 20% ratio, we classify the risk on that day as
low risk of crisis in the financial market with color green. On the website, the current risk
level is marked with a cross as shown in Figure 7 for this example.
Figure 7. Risk Levels of FRM























































































4. Causality of FRM and Other Systemic Risk Measures
Zbonakova et al. (2017) analyzed the factors affecting the value of λ and summarized that λ
depend on three major factors: the variance of the error term, the correlation structure of the
covariates and the number of non-zero coefficients of the model. Since high volatility
indicates high risk in finance and the number of non-zero coefficients is related to the
connectedness of the financial firms, they provide more theoretical evidence for the
FRM as a risk measure. In their application, they find a co-integration relationship between
λ̂ and other systemic risk measures. We extend their idea and use Granger causality
analysis to validate FRM. We selected three measures: VIX (see Hallett, 2009), SRISK
(see Brownlees and Engle, 2016) as well as the Google trends of the key word “financial
crisis” (see Preis et al., 2013).
For the causality analysis, we first need to introduce the Vector Autoregression (VAR)
model briefly. Lütkepohl (2005) proposes the VAR(P) model as follows:
yt ¼ αþ A1yt1 þ A2yt2 þ    þ APytP þ ut, ð3Þ
where yt ¼def ðy1t,…, yKtÞ>, Ai are fixed (K  K) coefficient matrices, ut is a K-dimensional
process. The coefficients could be estimated by applying multivariate least squares esti-
mation. In order to perform the Granger causality test, the vector of endogenous variables
yt is split into two subvectors y1t and y2t with dimensions ðK1  1Þ and ðK2  1Þ and
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The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the subvector y1t does not Granger-
cause y2t, which is defined as A21, i ¼ 0 for i ¼ 1, 2,…,P. The alternative hypothesis states
Table 2. Risk Levels, Color Codes and Ratios for FRM
Color Risk Level Description FRM Ratio
Green Low risk of crisis in the financial market. < 20
The incidence of a crisis is less likely than usual.
Blue General risk of crisis in the financial market. 20–40
There is no specific risk of a crisis.
Yellow Elevated risk of crisis in the financial market. 40–60
The incidence of a crisis is somewhat higher than usual.
Orange High risk of crisis in the financial market. 60–80
A crisis might occur very soon.
Red Severe risk of a crisis in the financial market. > 80
A financial crisis is imminent or happening right now.























































































that the subvector y1t Granger-causes y2t and is defined as: 9A21, i 6¼ 0 for i ¼ 1, 2,…,P.
The test statistic follows a F distribution with PK1K2 and KJ  n degrees of freedom,
where J is the sample size and n equals the total number of parameters in the above VAR
(P) model.
4.1. FRM versus VIX
The VIX series is often addressed as a “fear index” and can be interpreted as a measure for
systemic risk (Hallett, 2009). For reasons of comparability, we standardize these two series
by setting the lowest value in the sample to zero and the highest to one. Figure 8 plots the
standardized FRM series (thick black line) and the VIX series (thin red line). The plot
shows that both indicators move in the same direction, with the VIX series a little more
volatile. We also get some evidence of some financial events by observing the corre-
sponding volatility levels of the FRM and VIX. For example, in the end of 2008, there is a
sharp upward trend of FRM, whereas the upward trends dominates VIX as well, which
corresponds to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. Both FRM and
VIX have higher values between 2008 and 2010, which corresponds to the time period of
the financial crises. After 2013, the values of FRM were relative stable at a low level, while
there was a similar pattern of VIX, which showed signs of the slow recovery of the global
economy from the recession.
Before we perform the Granger causality test, we test for stationarity of both time series
with the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test. The results of the test are shown in
Table 3. For the FRM series, the p value is larger than 0:05, so we cannot reject the null
Figure 8. (Color online) Scaled FRM (Thick Black Line) and VIX (Thin Red Line)





























































































hypothesis, i.e., the FRM series may have a unit root and may be non-stationary. We reject
the null hypothesis for the VIX series with a p value smaller than 0:05 and conclude that
the VIX series is stationary. We do not need to consider the co-integration problem, since
only if both series are non-stationary, we should take into account the co-integration. There
is a trade-off between using the original data and the transformed (differenced) data to find
the causality relationship. Sims (1980) prefers to use the original data. He argues that VAR
with non-stationary variables may provide important insights, if one is interested in the
nature of relationships between variables. Brooks (2014) also states that differencing will
destroy information on any long-run relationships between the series. However, other
people argue that the original non-stationary data might lead to untrusted estimation, see
Yule (1926) and Granger and Newbold (1974). In our case, we consider both the original
data and transformed data.
Firstly, we consider the original data. We choose the VAR order according to four
criteria: the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Hannan–Quinn information criterion
(HQ), the Schwarz criterion (SC) and the Prediction Error Criterion (FPE), see Table 4.
While HQ and SC suggest an order 3 VAR process, AIC and FPE suggest an order 20
process. We fit both VAR models with order 3 and order 20. Next, we check the auto-
correlation of the residuals to decide the optimal order. Four tests are carried out: the
asymptotic Portmanteau Test, the adjusted Portmanteau Test, the Breusch–Godfrey LM test
and the Edgerton–Shukur F test. The null hypothesis of these tests is that there is no first-
order autocorrelation among residuals. Choosing order 3 and 20 leads to the rejection of all
these tests (cf. Table 5). Subsequently, we try the other orders and find that with order 11,
Table 4. Suggested Order for VAR Process
by Different Criteria
Model AIC HQ SC FPE
FRM and VIX 20 3 3 20
DFRM and VIX 19 8 5 19
Table 5. p Values of Model Selection Tests
Model Order VAR PT (Asymptotic) PT (Adjusted) BG ES
FRM and VIX 3 < 2.2 1016 < 2.2 1016 1.1 1007 1.0 1007
11 2.5 1007 2.0 1007 1.6 1001 1.71001
20 < 2.2 1016 < 2.2 1016 3.1 1008 4.1 1008
DFRM and VIX 5 2.2 1016 2.2 1016 3.2 1008 3.1 1008
8 6.7 1012 4.9 1012 1.4 1006 1.5 1006
11 2.3 1009 1.8 1009 1.5 1003 1.7 1003
19 1.7 1003 1.6  1003 5.5 1008 7.2 1008























































































both the Breusch–Godfrey LM test and the Edgerton–Shukur F tests are passed. Therefore,
we select order 11. The autocorrelation function of the residuals is plotted in Figure 9.
Table 6 shows the results of the Granger causality test. All p values are smaller than 0:05
which indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, FRM Granger causes VIX,
and VIX Granger causes FRM.
Next, we consider the transformed series. Since FRM is non-stationary, we take the first
difference. The transformed series is called as DFRM. In Table 3, we see that DFRM is
stationary. Then the same procedure is performed. While HQ suggests an order 8 process,
SC suggests an order 5, and AIC and FPE both suggest an order 19 (cf. Table 4). After
checking the four tests for autocorrelation of the residuals, we conclude that the optimal
order is 19. Although it does not pass the autocorrelation test, the p value is close to the
critical value 0:05, and the autocorrelation function confirms this result (cf. Tables 5 and
Figure 10). The result of the Granger causality test is summarized in Table 6. We find that
all p values are significantly smaller than 0:05, which indicates that the null hypothesis is
rejected. Therefore, we conclude that DFRM Granger causes VIX, and also VIX Granger
causes DFRM.
Figure 9. Autoregression Functions of FRM and VIX
Table 6. p Values of Granger Causality Test
Cause Effect p Values
FRM VIX 4.0 1008
VIX FRM 6.1 1011
DFRM VIX 6.6 1011
VIX DFRM 8.7 1013























































































4.2. FRM versus SRISK
SRISK is a macro-finance measure of systemic risk (Acharya et al., 2012; Brownlees and
Engle, 2016). Our data on SRISK for the US are obtained from V-Lab.3 We also stan-
dardize SRISK, so that both series are comparable on the same scale. Figure 11 plots the
standardized FRM series (thick black line) and the SRISK series (thin blue line). We see
that there is a peak in the first quarter of 2008 for SRISK, but afterwards FRM and SRISK
have similar patterns. Especially during the beginning of 2010 and the beginning of 2012,
the two series have a similar shape.
We perform the same procedure as in Section 4.1. The results of the ADF test for the
SRISK series in Table 7 show that the series is non-stationary. Since the FRM series is
3See the Systemic Risk Analysis Welcome Page: https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk/.
Figure 11. (Color online) Scaled FRM (Thick Black Line) and SRISK (Thin Blue Line)
Figure 10. Autoregression Functions of DFRM and VIX























































































neither stationary, we consider the co-integration of them. From Granger (1988), we know
that if both series are co-integrated, then there must be Granger causality between them in
at least one way. We perform the Engle–Granger 2-step test for co-integration, which is
suitable for bivariate time series. In the first step, the linear regression of FRM on SRISK
carried out, i.e., FRM is the explanatory variable and SRISK the response variable. In the
second step, we test the residuals of the aforementioned linear regression. If these residuals
are stationary, then there is co-integration of FRM and SRISK. The null hypothesis of this
test is that the residuals are non-stationary. The result of this test are summarized in
Table 8. We conclude that FRM and SRISK are co-integrated, in other words, FRM
Granger causes SRISK. If we regress SRISK on FRM, i.e., SRISK is the explanatory
variable and FRM the response variable, we also conclude that SRISK and FRM are co-
integrated, which indicates that SRISK Granger causes FRM. We thus conclude that there
is mutual causality between FRM and SRISK.
4.3. FRM versus Google Trends
Finally, we analyze the relationship between FRM and Google Trends (GT) for the key-
word “financial crisis”. Google Trends provides data on the search volume of particular
words and phrases relative to the total search volume. This can be disaggregated by
countries. If a keyword is more frequently searched for, this might indicate a particular
interest. Preis et al. (2013) analyzed the data related to finance from Google Trends, and
found that Google Trends data did not only reflect the current state of the stock markets,
but may have also been able to forecast certain future trends. We use Google Trends for the
keyword “financial crisis”, assuming that more people will search for this term if they feel
the risk for a financial crisis is high. The Google Trends data are weekly data. To allow for
comparison with the FRM, we apply cubic interpolation to estimate daily data from the
Table 7. p Values of ADF Test for




Table 8. Results of Engle–Granger 2-step Co-Integration Test
Explanatory (Cause) Response (Effect) Value of Test-Statistic Critical Value at 5%
FRM SRISK 3.1 1.95
SRISK FRM 2.7 1.95























































































weekly Google Trends series. This series is compared with the daily FRM series. Figure 12
plots both the daily FRM series as well as the cubic interpolated Google Trends daily
series. Both series are standardized to the interval zero-one for comparison. We observe
some co-movement between both series, but no continuous superiority of the Google
Trends above FRM.
The ADF test shows that the GT series is stationary (cf. Table 9). We perform two tests
for the relationship between the two series. First, we consider the original data of FRM,
then we consider the transformed data. We perform four criteria to find the optimal order of
VAR model. As the results in Table 10 show, all the criteria suggest an order 20 VAR
process. Therefore, we apply an order 20 VAR models. Next, the autocorrelation of the
residuals is tested. Although none of the tests can be passed (cf. Table 11), we have no
better choice for the order than 20. The autocorrelation function of residuals are plotted in
Figure 13. Table 12 shows the results of the Granger causality test. All p values are
Figure 12. (Color online) Scaled FRM (Thick Black Line) and Google Trends (Thin Green Line)
Table 9. p Values of ADF Test





Table 10. Suggested Order for VAR Process by
Different Criteria
Model AIC HQ SC FPE
FRM and GT 20 20 20 20
DFRM and GT 20 20 20 20























































































significantly smaller than 0:05, which indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected.
Therefore, FRM Granger causes GT, and GT Granger causes FRM.
For the first differenced FRM, i.e., DFRM, the same procedure is used. In Table 10, all
the criteria suggests an order 20 VAR process. The result of the autocorrelation tests are
presented in Table 10. Although none of the tests are passed, we still use order 20. The
autocorrelation function of the residuals is shown in Figure 14. Table 12 shows the results
of the Granger causality test. All p values are significantly smaller than 0:05, which
Table 11. p Values of Model Selection Tests
Model Order PT (Asymptotic) PT (Adjusted) BG ES
FRM and GT 20 < 2.2 1016 < 2.2 1016 < 2.2 1016 < 2.2 1016
DFRM and GT 20 < 2.2 1016 < 2.2 1016 < 2.2 1016 < 2.2 1016
Figure 13. Autoregression Functions of FRM and GT
Table 12. p Values of Granger
Causality Test
Cause Effect p Values
FRM GT 1.1 1010
GT FRM 2.1 1012
DFRM GT 6.8 1011
GT DFRM 4.1 1010























































































indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, DFRM Granger causes GT, and GT
Granger causes DFRM.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed and developed an AI based measure for systemic risk in
financial markets: the FRM. The FRM is a measure for systemic risk based on the penalty
term λ of the linear quantile lasso regression, which is defined as the average of the λ series
over the 100 largest US publicly-traded financial institutions. The implementation is car-
ried out by using parallel computing. The risk levels are classified by five levels. The
empirical result shows that our FRM can be a good indicator for trends in systemic risk.
Compared with other systemic risk measures, such as VIX, SRISK, Google Trends with
the keyword “financial crisis”, we find that the FRM and VIX, FRM and SRISK, FRM and
GT mutually Granger cause one another, which means that our FRM is a good measure of
systemic risk for the US financial market. All the codes of FRM are published on www.
quantlet.de with keyword FRM. The R package Risk Analytics (Borke, 2017b) is
another tool with the purpose of integrating and facilitating the research, calculation and
analysis methods around the FRM project (Borke, 2017a). The up-to-date FRM can be
found in http://frm.wiwi.hu-berlin.de.
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Figure 14. Autoregression Functions of DFRM and GT























































































Appendix A. Financial Institutions
Table A.1. The List of 100 Financial Companies Used to Estimate FRM in Our Sample
WFC Wells Fargo & Company AON Aon plc
JPM J P Morgan Chase & Co ALL Allstate Corporation
BAC Bank of America Corporation BEN Franklin Resources, Inc.
C Citigroup Inc. STI SunTrust Banks, Inc.
AIG American International Group, Inc. MCO Moody’s Corporation
GS Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. PGR Progressive Corporation
USB U.S. Bancorp AMP Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc.
AXP American Express Company AMTD TD Ameritrade Holding Corporation
MS Morgan Stanley HIG Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.
BLK BlackRock, Inc. TROW T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.
MET MetLife, Inc. NTRS Northern Trust Corporation
PNC PNC Financial Services
Group, Inc. (The)
MTB M&T Bank Corporation
BK Bank Of New York Mellon
Corporation (The)
FITB Fifth Third Bancorp
SCHW The Charles Schwab Corporation IVZ Invesco Plc
COF Capital One Financial Corporation L Loews Corporation
PRU Prudential Financial, Inc. EFX Equifax, Inc.
TRV The Travelers Companies, Inc. PFG Principal Financial Group Inc
CME CME Group Inc. RF Regions Financial Corporation
CB Chubb Corporation MKL Markel Corporation
MMC Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. FNF Fidelity National Financial, Inc.
BBT BB&T Corporation LNC Lincoln National Corporation
ICE Intercontinental Exchange Inc. CBG CBRE Group, Inc.
STT State Street Corporation KEY KeyCorp
AFL Aflac Incorporated NDAQ The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc.
CINF Cincinnati Financial Corporation CACC Credit Acceptance Corporation
CNA CNA Financial Corporation BRO Brown & Brown, Inc.
HBAN Huntington Bancshares Incorporated ERIE Erie Indemnity Company
SEIC SEI Investments Company OZRK Bank of the Ozarks
ETFC E*TRADE Financial Corporation WTM White Mountains Insurance Group, Ltd.
AMG Affiliated Managers Group, Inc. SNV Synovus Financial Corp.
RJF Raymond James Financial, Inc. ISBC Investors Bancorp, Inc.
UNM Unum Group MKTX MarketAxess Holdings, Inc.
NYCB New York Community Bancorp, Inc. LM Legg Mason, Inc.
Y Alleghany Corporation CBSH Commerce Bancshares, Inc.
SBNY Signature Bank BOKF BOK Financial Corporation
CMA Comerica Incorporated EEFT Euronet Worldwide, Inc.
AJG Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. DNB Dun & Bradstreet Corporation
TMK Torchmark Corporation WAL Western Alliance Bancorporation
WRB W.R. Berkley Corporation EV Eaton Vance Corporation
AFG American Financial Group, Inc. CFR Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc.
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